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Abstract:  Malicious network traffic, including widespread worm activity, is a growing 
threat to Internet-connected networks and hosts. In this paper, we consider two competing 
approaches  to  dynamic  network  intrusion  detection:  syntax  based  and  semantics  based 
approaches.  For  the  syntax  driven  approach,  we  propose  two  sliding  window  based 
schemes  to  generate  potential  worm  signatures  automatically.  Since  syntax  based 
approaches cannot cope well with sophisticated polymorphic and metamorphic worms, the 
semantics-based approach is a better alternative. Our contribution in this work is threefold: 
(a) our syntax-based scheme that uses variable-length partition with multiple breakmarks 
can detect many polymorphic worms, (b) we believe our semantic-based prototype is the 
first NIDS that provides semantics-aware capability and our system  is more efficient than 
what is reported by Christodorescu et al (2005), (c) our designed templates can capture 
polymorphic shellcodes with added sequences of stack and mathematic operations. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, computer intrusion has been on the rise. The 
popularity  of  the  Internet  and  the  widespread  use  of 
homogeneous  software  provide  an  ideal  climate  for 
infectious programs. The cost of viruses and worms in 2002 
was estimated to be 45 billion dollars (Reuters 2003). In 
2003,  this  number  jumped  to  55  billion  dollars  (Reuters 
2003).  Much  money  has  to  be  spent  on  researching 
techniques  that  can  fend  off  intrusion  attempts  such  that 
computer  systems  can  operate  effectively.  A  popular 
technology called the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has 
emerged to identify and block intrusion attempts. Popular 
network IDS (NIDS) systems such as Snort (Roesch 1999) 
and Bro (Paxson 1998) utilize a signature-based approach to 
detect  malicious  network  traffic.  In  these  systems,  static 
signatures  of  known  attacks  are  used  to  identify  attack 
packets. A major drawback of this approach is that unknown 
attacks cannot be detected – the ones, which conceivably 
will cause the most damage. 
Typically, new attacks are detected in an ad hoc fashion 
through  a  combination  of  intrusion  detection  systems 2   
alerting  potential  attacks,  and  skilled  security  personnel 
manually  analyzing  traffic  to  generate  attack 
characterization. Such an approach is clearly not sufficient 
since it may take hours to generate a new worm signature. 
In recent studies by Moore et al. (2004), the authors suggest 
that if the attack traffic is indicative of a worm outbreak, 
effective containment may require a reaction time of well 
under sixty seconds. Thus, new techniques that can help to 
identify threats from unseen worms or exploit packets need 
to be devised. 
In this paper, we discuss two competing approaches for 
dynamic  network  intrusion  detection,  namely  the  syntax-
based  and  semantic-based  approaches.  Sliding  window 
schemes  as  presented  by  Kim  et  al.  (2004),  Singh  et  al. 
(2004),  and  Newsome  et  al.  (2005)  are  syntax-based 
approaches  that  partition  suspicious  worm  payloads  to 
generate worm signatures. They are based on the premise 
that some portion of the malicious codes will inevitably be 
invariant, despite attempts to obscure their true natures for 
detection avoidance. In this paper, we describe two sliding 
window  schemes.  One  scheme  uses  fixed-length  partition 
while the other uses variable-length partition.  To minimize 
the number of signatures that are retained, we use similar 
threshold-based  unique  source/destination  IPs  approach 
described  in  Kim  et  al.  (2004).  We  also  use  clustering 
algorithm  to  include  similar  signatures  so  that  the  false 
negative rate can be reduced. Via extensive traffic analysis, 
we demonstrate that one of the schemes called the variable 
length partition with multiple breakmarks (VPMB) scheme 
is effective in detecting several polymorphic worms. 
While  the  syntax-based  approaches  can  catch  many 
polymorphic worms, they will still miss certain categories 
of polymorphic worms. A worm author may craft a worm 
that changes substantially its payload on every successive 
spreading attempt, and thus evades matching by any single 
substring  signature  that  does  not  also  occur  in  innocuous 
traffic.  This  motivates  us  to  propose  another  NIDS  with 
semantics-aware capability. The prototype system that we 
have  built  can  potentially  identify  threats  from  some 
unknown  malicious  network  traffic.  This  work  is  an 
extension of the approach presented in Christodorescu et al. 
(2004). The semantics-aware malware detection algorithm 
of Christodorescu et al (2005) is an extremely powerful tool 
for program profiling. Based on the observation that certain 
malicious behaviors appear in all variants of a certain kind 
of  malware,  the  authors  propose  using  template-based 
matching  to  detect  malware.  Their  approach  looks  for  a 
match  of  program  behaviors  rather  than  program  syntax 
matching.  In  this  manner,  polymorphic a n d  metamorphic 
code instances can be identified right along with their static 
counterparts. However, in Christodorescu et al. (2004), the 
authors only perform experiments on a non-networked host 
with standalone  virus  samples  as  well  as  evaluating  their 
templates against a set of benign programs. As most threats 
to end-systems now emanate from the Internet, much in the 
form  of  self-propagating  network  code,  network  enabled 
detection is critical. Thus, in this paper, we report on a full-
featured  semantics-aware  network  intrusion  detection 
system  we  have  built.  Our  system  can  detect  not  only 
viruses,  but  remote  exploits,  including  worm  traffic. 
Through rigorous testing, we show that semantic detection 
is  an  extremely  powerful  tool  for  identifying  static  and 
polymorphic  network  exploits.  Our  system  can  perform 
more  efficiently  than  the  system  presented  in 
Christodorescu et al. (2004). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, 
we  describe  some  related  work  and  discuss  how  several 
pieces  of  work  motivate  this  research.  In  Section  3,  we 
describe the motivation for three sliding window schemes 
that we propose for the syntax-based approach. In Section 4, 
we present our experiments and results we obtained using 
the  syntax-based  approach.  In  Section  5,  we  describe  the 
semantic analysis of malicious code, and discuss how binary 
exploits  work.  In  Section  6,  we  present  the  system 
architecture of the NIDS we have built and describe in detail 
how different stages of the system work. We describe our 
experiments  and  the  results  we  obtained  in  Section  7. 
Finally, we summarize our findings and discuss some future 
work that we intend to explore in Section 8. 
2  RELATED WORK 
Much research has been devoted to intrusion detection in 
recent years. Two enormously popular open source tools, 
Snort (Roesch 1999) and Bro (Paxson 1998), have shown 
that static signature based IDSs can be quite successful in 
the  face  of  known  attacks.  Combined  with  automatic 
monitoring  and  incident  response,  system  administrators 
have a powerful tool against network attacks. In Locasto et 
al.  (2004),  the  authors  present  the  case  for  collaborative 
intrusion detection system where intrusion detection nodes 
cooperate to determine if a network attack is taking place 
and take corrective actions if it does. Others have sought to 
use statistical approaches to detect worm outbreaks. In Gao 
et  al.  (2004),  the  authors  propose  a  method  to  identify  a 
worm victim by observing if the number of scans per second 
it  performs  exceeds  a  certain  threshold.  The  numbers  of 
worm  victims  observed  in  successive  windows  are  then 
compared to the numbers predicted using a typical worm 
spread model and if they match, then a worm outbreak is 
declared. 
In Kim et al. (2004) and Singh et al. (2004), the authors 
show that byte-level analysis of packet payloads can yield 
useful signatures for worm detection.  We referred to this as 
the  syntax-based  sliding  window  approach.  Such  sliding 
window schemes are based on the premise that some portion 
of  malicious  code  will  inevitably  be  invariant  despite 
attempts at obscuring its true nature for detection avoidance. 
In this approach, the payload of a packet is partitioned into 
multiple chunks when a hosen breakmark is detected and 
Rabin fingerprints of these data chunks are generated. There 
is no comparison as to whether a fixed or variable partition 
works equally well. Thus, we proposed and evaluated two 
schemes  that  compare  between  fixed  and  variable-length 
partitions. In addition, we also extend the work in Kim et al. 
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breakmark as described in Singh et al. (2004). Our multiple 
breakmark approach is similar to a recent paper Newsome et 
al. (2004). The authors in Newsome et al. (2004) advocate 
using disjoint data signatures. 
At  first  glance,  these  syntax-based  approaches  looked 
promising, however, in practice, they generate far too many 
signatures,  with  a  sometimes-undesirable  accuracy  rate. 
With Newsome et al. (2004), we begin to see a research 
trend  towards  using  semantics  knowledge  for  potential 
worm  detection.  Here,  the  authors  observe  that  invariant 
byte  positions  may  be  disjoint  (a  result  of  advanced 
polymorphic techniques), but will be present nonetheless as 
they are integral to functionality. With Christodorescu et al. 
(2004)  and  Yegneswaran  et  al.  (2006),  the  application  of 
semantics is introduced. Non-binary attacks, such as URL 
based web server exploits, are analyzed and clustered in a 
data-mining scheme in Yegneswaran et al. (2006). In this 
work,  we  built  upon  the  approach  described  in 
Christodorescu  et  al.  (2004).  Our  contributions  in  the 
semantic  aware  related  approach  are  three  fold:  (a)  our 
prototype is a complete NIDS that provides semantic aware 
capability,  (b)  our  implementation  is  more  efficient  than 
what  is  reported  in  Christodorescu  et  al.  (2004),  (c)  our 
designed templates can capture polymorphic shellcodes with 
added sequences of stack and mathematic operations. 
3  SYNTAX BASED SLIDING WINDOW SCHEMES 
In  this  section, w e  d e s c r i b e  t w o  s l i d i n g  w i n d o w -based 
schemes that we proposed to automatically generate worm 
signatures. As in Kim et al. (2004) and Singh et al. (2004), 
we  divide  the  payload  of  a  packet  into  multiple  chunks 
either  using  fixed-size  window  or  variable-length  sliding 
window  until  a  chosen  breakmark  is  detected.  Rabin 
fingerprints  (Broder  1992),  (Rabin  1981)  of  these  data 
chunks are then generated. 
3.1  Fixed Partition Sliding Window Scheme (FPSW)  
   The FPSW scheme incorporates a fixed window size and a 
one-byte window sliding. The premise is simple – a series 
of fingerprints is generated as the window slides down the 
payload  of  a  packet.  Common  signatures  will  be  seen 
among  different  packet  payloads  if  their  contents  are 
identical  or  similar.  If  the  window  size  is  small  enough, 
common data portions can be isolated, despite the variation 
in  the  overall  payloads.  This  is  useful  for  the  dynamic 
detection  of  new  worm  variants  (e.g.  W32.Blaster  versus 
W32.Blaster.H). Figure 1 shows the operation of the sliding 
window using FPSW. The segments in f0, f1, and f2 will all 
be fingerprinted. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1   Three instances of an 8-byte sliding window, beginning 
at ‘0’ for the FPSW scheme 
  One important decision related to this approach is choosing 
a proper window size. If the window size is very small (just 
a few bytes), the false positive rates will be higher. Certain 
short sequences are bound to appear in benign traffic as well 
as in malicious code. For example, "GET /" is typically at 
the  beginning  of  a  basic  web  request,  but  could  also  be 
followed  by  malicious  exploit  code.  A  5-byte  window 
would match both to the same fingerprint. In addition, the 
amount  of  signatures  generated  is  always  related  to  the 
window  size.  Smaller  windows  will  produce  more 
fingerprints,  thus  placing  a  higher  burden  on  storing  and 
searching. 
3.2  Variable-length Partition with Multiple Breakmarks 
Scheme (VPMB) 
   In  a  polymorphic  exploit,  we  often  see  a  static  region 
initiating a request (for example, a web based exploit may 
begin  with  a  normal  HTTP  GET  request),  followed  by  a 
region of instructions that function as NOP equivalents (K2 
1998).  Thus, our VPMB scheme incorporates a one-byte 
sliding  window  approach  until  a  series  of  breakmarks  is 
reached.  The  breakmarks  are  chosen  to  be  NOP-like 
instructions. In this method, using a look-ahead window of 
size  w b y t e s ,  w e  s e a r c h  a n d  s e e  i f  a l l  t h e  b y t e s  i n  t h i s  
window can be found in a set of 76 breakmarks that have 
been identified. By using an adjustable look-ahead size to 
match these NOP-like instructions, we can reliably generate 
consistent fingerprints for the static regions preceding the 
NOP-like instructions.  If they are, then we will generate a 
fingerprint using all the bytes that appear before this look-
ahead window. After that, we begin a new search using a 
new window that begins 1 byte after the previously matched 
position. Figure 2 shows the operation of VPMB with three 
different window sizes: 5 bytes, 10 bytes, and 15 bytes. The 
same initial byte region is isolated in all three, producing 
one, consistent signature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2   Example of VPMB with three different window sizes     
 
An appropriate choice of look-ahead size is required to 
reduce the false positives. Similar to the FPSW's dilemma, 
choosing  a  smaller  size  will  increase  false  positives.  But 
how small is too small? Through testing (as will be shown 
later), it has been determined that a size of 20 bytes reduces 
false  positives  to  a  minimum.  Tested  cases  with  values 
greater than 20 did not result in further reductions of false 
positive but incurred additional processing cost. Insight as 
to why 20 is the "magic" look-ahead size is the following - 
the  probability  of  finding  a  grouping  of  NOP-like 
instructions  in  benign  traffic  drops  considerably  as  the 4   
window  size  is  increased.  But  in  actual  exploits,  NOP 
regions  tend  to  be  larger  than  20  bytes  (so  guessing  an 
address back into the stack is a simpler process). Thus, 20 
represents  the  point  at  which  false  positives  drop  to  a 
minimum, and true positives don't require excess processing 
time.  
4  EVALUATION OF SYNTAX BASED APPROACHES  
To compare between the two schemes described in Section 
3 and to evaluate the false positive/false negative rates of 
such a worm detection system, each of these algorithms has 
been implemented and applied to two one-hour traces that 
are  extracted  from  a  whole  day's    traffic  trace  that  was 
kindly made available by Pang et al (2004).  In this whole-
day trace, traffic was observed from two /16 subnets (16K 
addresses) on two adjacent class B networks. Traffic from 
only  one  class  C  network  contained  within  this  trace  is 
considered in this study. The total packet count for each 1-
hour  trace  is  23,554  and  6,834  respectively.  Each  1-hour 
trace  is  further  divided  into  5-minute  intervals.  Signature 
generation is performed on the traffic obtained in every 5-
minute interval. To minimize the number of packets that the 
signature generation module needs to process, some simple 
filtering is performed on the trace: (i) only incoming packets 
destined for the target network are considered, (ii) only TCP 
packets  with  the  PUSH  flag  set  are  taken  for  fingerprint 
generation. The methods, however, can be used for other 
attack packets (i.e. UDP-based attacks) as well. All data in 
each  packet  is  considered  for  analysis  (i.e.,  no  static 
SNAPLEN  is  utilized).  We  have  chosen  to  examine 
contiguous  blocks  of  time  over  random  time  samples  in 
order  to  reflect  realistic  attack  detection.  In  practice, 
sustained scanning/propagation activity from a single host 
operating at a particular time interval is common. Thus, we 
wanted to get a sense of how this detection would operate in 
a real-time environment.   
4.1  FPSW 
   As previously mentioned, because of the potential large 
number  of  fingerprints  that  can  be  generated  using  the 
FPSW scheme, it is desirable to find ways to reduce the 
number  of  signatures  to  be  retained  for  future  intrusion 
detection  purposes.  To  accomplish  this,  the  simple  IP 
address dispersion algorithm proposed by Yegneswaran et 
al.  (2005)  has  been  implemented.  This  algorithm  is  well 
suited for detecting rapidly spreading worms, by observing 
the frequency of distinct source and destination IP addresses 
of  packets  carrying  a  particular  fingerprint.  If  a  single 
fingerprint is sent from at least n distinct source IPs, and is 
destined  to a t  l e a s t  n d i s t i n c t  d e s t i n a t i o n  I P s ,  t h e n ,  i t  i s  
retained.  A  further  trimming  of  the  fingerprint  pool  is 
performed for each test by discarding fingerprints generated 
from data chunks with a high prevalence of NULL bytes 
(i.e. {00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 80}). These fingerprints are 
far too general, and have little value for detecting malicious 
traffic. 
   To  cope  with  polymorphic  worms,  we  want  to  include 
additional  signatures  among  those  not  retained  but  were 
created by payloads that bear similar resemblance to those 
with retained signatures. To do so, we use Levenshtein Edit 
Distance  algorithm  (Levenshtein  1965)  to  find  similar 
fingerprints (amongst those that have not been retained) to 
the ones that have been retained for each 5 minute interval. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3   Signature counts for 2 1-hour traces 
 
 
 
   Figure 3 contains two graphs representing the application 
of classification and clustering against the FPSW scheme 
for the two one-hour capture intervals. Each graph interval 
(a  five  minute  portion  from  the  trace)  increases 
cumulatively, with only new signatures being added to the 
total  pool.  Classification  (using  the  algorithm  described 
above) was performed at two different thresholds (T: T = 3 
and  T =  5 .  F r o m  t h e  g r a p h s ,  w e  s e e  that  thousands  of 
signatures  are  discarded  at  T =  3 ,  w h i l e  o n l y  a  s l i g h t  
decrease occurs from T = 3 to T = 7. When the clustering 
algorithm  (also  described  above)  is  applied  at  both 
thresholds, we see a slight increase in the signature pool, as 
expected. Via clustering, a total of 274 signatures are added 
to the signature pool, with about 23 signatures added per 5-
minute interval in hour 1, and 111 signatures with about 9 
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are  able  to  tune  the  signature  pool  accordingly,  with  the 
maximum amount of useful signatures retained. 
From what has been shown thus far, it is clear that FPSW 
has the potential to generate a large number of signatures. 
So, in response, we are interested in knowing the minimum 
amount  of  fingerprints  needed  to  recognize  malware 
variants.  Thus,  we  mold  the  FPSW  process  into  a  multi-
stage, computational pipeline, which will output a minimum 
set  of  fingerprints  for  suspected  malicious  traffic.  These 
fingerprints will be stored for future detection use. Figure 4 
shows the process of this pipeline. The first three stages, 
which have already been briefly described, pull traffic from 
the network, generate Rabin fingerprints, and classify the 
prints for retention.  The fourth stage generates a minimum 
fingerprint  set  by  finding  the  minimum  intersection  of 
fingerprints  that  covers  all  connection  flows  between  set 
time intervals (in our testing, 5 minute windows in an hour) 
per  destination  port.  After  K  windows  (in  our  testing, 
K=12), we have M signatures retained. We check how many 
suspicious packets (those from flows which are retained due 
to the IP address dispersion rule) match each signature and 
retain  the  top  W  (W  sets  to  3).  Fingerprints  that  are  not 
specific  enough  (those  with  many  ‘00’  groupings)  are 
immediately discarded. 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4   FPSW Pipeline 
 
With  fingerprint  reduction,  we  can  get  an  idea  of  the 
utility  of  the  FPSW  scheme.  Tables  1  and  2  display  the 
results of this process for the WebDAV Search exploit. The 
first column in each table indicates the real instances of the 
exploit  in  the  sample  data  (determined  by  snort  IDS 
analysis). Two different classification thresholds are shown 
(T = 3 and T = 7), with total unique prints increasing as time 
progresses.  As  expected,  we  retain  fewer  prints  as  the 
classification threshold is increased. Finally, the last column 
in each table represents the minimum number of fingerprints 
needed to identify all malicious flows per time interval.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1   WevDAV Hour 1 
 
 
Between both hours, a final total of three unique prints are 
needed to identify all real instances of WebDAV present. In 
order to assess the false positive rate, we processed an entire 
month’s worth of benign network traffic, which resulted in 
498,020  total  fingerprints.  Out  of  this,  125  instances 
matched the 3 fingerprints isolated for WebDAV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2   WevDAV Hour 2 
 
We also conducted tests against known instances of the 
Welchia  worm.  Such  testing  produced  interesting  results 
regarding  malware  variants.  In  table  3,  we  see  that  the 
maximum  number  of  fingerprints  needed  to  identify  all 
instances in each flow per interval is 23, with a complete 
total of 23 unique fingerprints needed for the whole hour 
trace. In table 4, this number increases to 43. Specifically, at 
time interval 45, we note a variation of Welchia that was not 
present  in  the  first  hour.  Despite  this  final  number  of 
fingerprints  being  larger  than  WebDAV’s  3,  it  is  still  a 
significant improvement over 298 prints retained when T = 
7. As with WebDAV, the false positive rate is also rather 
low.  Applied  to  the  same  month  of  benign  traffic  as 
WebDAV,  we  find  681  instances  of  false  matches  to 
Welchia’s fingerprints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3   Welchia Hour 1 
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Table 4   Welchia Hour 2 
 
 
4.2  VPMB 
 
To test this method, multiple polymorphic versions of the 
Blaster worm, Welchia worm, and WebDAV Search exploit 
were created using the ADMmutate (K2 1998) kit. Another 
experiment  was  devised  with  two  intents:  (a)  to  see  if 
consistent  signatures  are  produced  between  different 
polymorphic versions of the same exploit, and (b) to see if 
the false positive rate will increase if more fingerprints are 
retained.    In  this  experiment,  two  polymorphic  worm 
packets  of  each  type  were  injected  into  every  5-minute 
interval of the two hour-long traces and the VPMB scheme 
is used to see how many signatures are retained and how 
many worm packets of these 3 types are retained. 
  Tables 5 and 6 show the success and false-positive rate of 
the VPMB scheme. Using the 20-byte look-ahead window 
size, the VPMB scheme was able to identify all the worm 
packets that belong to these three types of malicious traffic. 
In testing, all six additional pieces of malicious traffic were 
detected, with only a single signature being generated for 
each distinct type. The performance of VPMB is worse with 
a 10-byte or a 5-byte look-ahead window. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5   Hour 1: VPMB, false positives - only three signatures 
are expected (signatures are cumulative) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6   Hour 2: VPMB, false positives - only three signatures 
are expected (signatures are cumulative) 
 
 
Additional  packets  are  classified  as  “worm”  packets 
because the generated signatures  are not specific enough; 
for each time interval, only three signatures are expected. In 
Table 5, the false positive rate is the highest with a 5-byte 
look-ahead window, yet, even at this low look-ahead size, 
the  worst  interval,  at  '40',  only  adds  13  false  signatures. 
With a 10-byte window, only one false signature is added at 
times '25' and '30'. Finally, with a 20-byte window, all false 
positives are eliminated. Table 6 follows closely to Table 5, 
with the exception of one false signature added at time '50' 
for the 20-byte look-ahead series. 
Figure 5   FPSW vs. VPMB 
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In  Figure  5,  the  two  graphs  represent  the  cumulative 
fingerprint  counts  for  VPMB  and  FPSW.  With  this 
comparison, we see that far fewer fingerprints are generated 
overall in the VPMB scheme. Both hours show roughly 100 
unique fingerprints added by the end of each hour. Because 
VPMB is more suited toward buffer overflow detection, if it 
doesn't find an appropriate breakmark (i.e. a series of NOPs) 
then it will take a fingerprint over the entire packet. This 
may not have the specificity of fingerprints generated by 
FPSW. 
5  SEMANTICS-AWARE DETECTION METHODOLOGY 
New malware or worms that have appeared recently indicate 
that  the  authors  of  such  malicious  code  often  use  code 
obfuscation to evade IDSs that use static signatures. There 
are  two  forms  of  code  obfuscation:  polymorphism a n d  
metamorphism.  Traditional  polymorphism  has  taken  the 
form of an encrypted body of code with an attached (and 
often  obfuscated)  decryption  routine.  The  encryption 
technique  used  is  good  enough  to  fool  pattern-matching 
IDSs.  Metamorphic  code  relies o n  t h e  o b f u s c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
entire  code  base,  including  code  transposition,  equivalent 
instruction  substitution,  jump  insertion,  NOP  insertion, 
garbage  instruction  insertion,  and  register  reassignment. 
Figure  6  shows  a  simple  decryption  routine  and  two 
obfuscated  variants  of  that  same  decryption  routine.  The 
decryption routine shown in Figure 6(a) consists of a loop 
that performs an xor of a memory location against a static 
key, followed by an increment of the memory address to the 
next location. Figure 6(b) makes several changes to the code 
in Figure 6(a), including obscuring the key by adding mov 
and  add i n s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  w o r k  w i t h  a  r e g i s t e r .  T h e  inc 
instruction is also substituted with an add instruction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6   Three equivalent code routines 
 
   These seemingly minor changes are good enough to fool 
a pattern matching IDS. Figure 6(c) improves on 6(b) by 
adding garbage instructions, and changing the code order 
while  preserving  the  execution  sequence  with  jmp 
instructions.  One  can  think  of  a  plethora  of  equivalent 
programs – thus, we must rely on the meaning of the code, 
and not its syntax, for reliable detection. 
   Christodorescu  et  al.  (2005)  reduce  the  problem  of 
semantic equivalency to a template matching problem. In 
essence,  if  we  can  create  a  template  describing  the 
expected behavior of a piece of code, we can match it to an 
actual code routine to see if the tested code exhibits the 
same  behavior.  Stated  formally  in  Christodorescu  et  al. 
(2005), “A program P satisfies a template T (denoted as P 
⋐= T) iff P contains an instruction sequence I such that I 
contains a behavior specified by T.” A template will consist 
of  a  sequence  of  instructions,  along  with  its  associated 
variables and symbolic constants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7   A template and matching assembly code segment 
 
  In Figure 7, we show an instance of a template on the left, 
and  a  matched  assembly  code  segment  on  the  right.  The 
template shown is designed to match the decryption routine 
described in Figure 6. Each template is simply a description 
of the behavior we expect from a known routine – not the 
exact  syntax  that  will  show  up  in  a  code  fragment.  By 
looking at the assembly code segment on the right, we see 
that  the  code  segment  does  not  have  a  one-to-one 
correspondence with the template but the behavior defined 
by the template is present in the code routine. Thus, we can 
construct  an  algorithm  to  locate  patterns  defined  in 
templates in real assembly code segments. 
  While Christodorescu et al. (2005) formalizes the template 
matching  problem  rather  nicely,  it  presents  a  somewhat 
limited  engineering  approach  to  intrusion  detection.  The 
system that the authors built currently assumes that malware 
samples are available as inputs to their system. In order for 
the  semantics-aware  approach  to  be  useful  in  a  NIDS,  a 
classifier needs to be provided so that semantic analysis is 
only performed on a small percentage of suspicious traffic. 
In  addition,  we  believe  that  false  positives  are  bound  to 
emerge unless a good classifier is provided. For example, 
during  the  course  of  this  research,  we  identified  several 
legitimate  programs  (Crypkey  2006),  (ASPack  2006)  that 
obscure binaries with simple encryption routines as a form 
of copy protection. Locating a decryption loop (the primary 
test  by  Christodorescu  et  al.  (2005))  within  a  program 
protected  by  one  of  these  applications  will  signal  a  false 
decode:
  xor byte ptr [eax], 95h
  inc eax
  loop decode
   (a) Simple xor based decryption routine
decode:
  mov ebx, 31h
  add ebx, 64h
  xor byte ptr [eax], ebx
  add eax, 1
  loop decode
   (b) 2nd instance of xor decryption routine
decode:
  mov ecx, 0
  inc ecx
  inc ecx
  jmp    one
 two:      add eax, 1
  jmp three
 one:   mov ebx, 31h
  add ebx, 64h
  xor byte ptr [eax], ebx
  jmp two
 three:   loop decode
   (c) obfuscated instance of xor decryption8   
alert.  As  copy  protection  schemes  begin  to  incorporate 
methods  reminiscent  of  code  circulating  in  the  computer 
underground,  we  expect  the  false  positive  rate  of  the 
detection scheme based on purely checking installed binary 
programs on an end-host as described by Christodorescu et 
al.  (2005) t o  g r o w  a c c o r d i n g l y .  However,  it  is  highly 
unlikely for copy protected program to be embedded in a 
web request sent by a scanning source, thus, one can easily 
differentiate between the two scenarios using a smart traffic 
classifier. Thus, we incorporate (a) a traffic classifier, and 
(b) a binary data identification and extraction module in our 
prototype.  The  combination  of  these  features,  and  the 
semantic analysis allow the NIDS system we have built to 
be  more  effective  than  other  NIDSs  that  are  based  on 
syntactic  pattern  matching  approaches.  In  addition,  our 
NIDS is more efficient than that reported by Christodorescu 
et al. (2005). 
6  SEMANTIC-AWARE NIDS 
Motivated by the work in Christodorescu et al. (2005), we 
developed a full NIDS with semantic-aware capability. Our 
NDIS segregates suspicious traffic from regular traffic flow, 
extracts  binary  data  from  suspicious  traffic  and  performs 
semantic  analysis  on  the  binary  data  in  order  to  identify 
potential threats. Such a NIDS does not rely on fingerprints 
or other syntax based methods. Figure 8 shows the system 
architecture  of  our  NIDS.  It  consists  of  five  major 
components, n a m e l y  ( a )  t r a f f i c  c l a s s i f i e r ,  ( b )  b i n a r y  d a t a  
identification and extraction module, (c) disassembler, (d) 
intermediate representation generator, (e) semantic analyzer. 
This  NIDS  can  be  deployed  on  a  standalone  machine 
connected to the network. 
 
6.1  Traffic Classification 
 
  Traffic  classification  is  necessary  to  determine  which 
packets are “interesting” and require further analysis. While 
it  is  possible  to  pass  all  traffic  directly  to  the  “Binary 
Detection  and  Extraction”  module,  it  is  more  efficient  to 
prune the traffic sent to the later stages, as they are very 
CPU-intensive.  Currently,  two  classification  schemes  are 
implemented in our prototype system. The first is a simple  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8    The semantic-aware NIDS architecture 
 
and  effective  honeypot s c h e m e .  W h e n  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  
initialized, it is given a list of decoy hosts that exist for no 
other  purpose  than  to  attract  unsolicited  traffic  (the 
effectiveness of honeypots has been explored in-depth by 
the  Honeynet  Project  (2006)).  Any  sending  host  emitting 
traffic  destined  for  a  honeypot  address  is  considered 
suspicious;  and  any  packets  sent  by  such  a  host  will  be 
analyzed. 
The  second  scheme  is  a  bit  more  complicated,  and  is 
useful  for  the  detection  of  widespread  worm  traffic. 
Initially,  we  note  the  un-used  IP  address  space  in  our 
network,  with  the  premise  that  any  traffic  repeatedly 
destined to the un-used address space may be indicative of 
malicious scanning. If a host sends an initial packet to an 
un-used address, a count n is initialized. If we continue to 
observe  this  host  sending  additional  packets  to  other  un-
used  addresses,  the  count  will  be  incremented  until  it 
reaches  a  threshold  t,  at  which  point,  packets  emanating 
from  that  suspicious  host  will  be  considered  for  further 
analysis. 
 
6.2  Binary Detection and Extraction 
 
   In this work, we are interested in examining binary threats 
primarily in the form of buffer overflow exploits (we do not 
currently  support  detection  of  textual  web  attacks,  brute 
force  password  attacks,  etc.).  Thus,  we  need  a  way  to 
identify binary data within packet payloads. To accomplish 
this  task,  we  need  to  understand  how  buffer  overflow 
exploits are constructed and presented to a victim host. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9    Format of buffer overflow exploits  
    
   Traditional buffer overflow exploits (Figure 9) have taken 
the  following  form:  a  region  of  NOP  instructions  at  the 
lowest  address  region  on  the  stack,  followed  by  the 
instructions the attacker wishes to execute, followed by a 
series  of  return  addresses  that  will  overwrite  the  return 
pointer  of  the  subroutine  and  point  back  into  the  stack. 
Historically  in  IDS,  it  has  been  easy  to  detect  the  NOP 
region, as it was only composed of a repeating series of the 
same  instruction  (i.e.  0x90  for  the  x86  architecture). 
However, this is no longer the case – polymorphic exploit 
generators can use a whole host of instructions that have 
“NOP-like” behavior, thus making the NOP region variant. 
This leaves us with the return address region as a possible 
place  to  observe  some  invariant  data. O n l y  t h e  l e a s t  
significant byte can be varied, since the return address must 
point back to a valid address in the buffer. 
   In practice, we observe network buffer overflow exploits 
to consist of a well-formed initial application layer protocol 
request,  with  exploit  content  usually  resembling  (but  not 
necessarily matching exactly) Figure 9 encapsulated within 
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what  is  abnormal,  we  can  often  locate  malicious  binary 
content. Figure 10 displays the content of the Code Red II 
worm exploit. Here, a well-formatted HTTP GET request is 
made  to  a  module  of  the  IIS  webserver.  A  stream  of 
repeated  ‘X’  characters  initiates  the  overflow,  and  these 
characters are followed by the Unicode data. Our module 
has the ability to distinguish between acceptable protocol 
usage  and  suspicious  repetition.  Thus,  we  can  locate  the 
approximate region where we believe the binary content is 
located, and extract it. In the case of Unicode data (as is 
observed in Figure 7), we translate  it  into  an  appropriate 
binary  form,  for  further  analysis.  This  process  will  yield 
some  binary  data  that  is  benign,  but  it  dramatically  cuts 
down on the amount of data that must be processed by the 
disassembler which is the slowest stage in our system. This 
binary identification and extraction process can be bypassed 
but  it  will  result  in  a  system  with  much  degraded 
performance. 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10    Code Red II exploit portion 
 
6.3  Semantic Analysis 
 
Because we have chosen a specific commercial product, 
IDA Pro (DataRescue, 2006) for our disassembler stage, our 
NIDS can only disassemble x86 code at the present. The 
binary  detection  and  extraction  stage  produces  special 
binary frames (binary data extracted from network packets) 
in a format that can be processed by the disassembler. Once 
an  assembly  code  representation  is  generated  by  the 
disassembler,  we  prune  the  code  to  include  only  the 
instructions we are interested in. Any excess code from the 
program frame is discarded. 
At this point, we have a sequence of instructions that we 
can analyze semantically. The semantic analyzer uses the 
template matching scheme Christodorescu et al. (2005) that 
we have described in Section 5. The templates that we built 
have the ability to handle out of order code, NOP insertion, 
junk  instruction  insertion,  and  register  reassignment.  If  a 
piece  of  code  matches  one  of  our  templates,  an  alert  is 
generated,  and  further  action  may  be  taken  against  the 
offending IP address. 
7  SYSTEM EVALUATION  
   We  have  conducted  an  extensive  evaluation  of  our 
semantic NIDS, against real malware samples and captured 
network traffic. All of our tests were performed on an Intel 
P4  2.8Ghz  system  with  512MB  of  memory.  One  of  our 
primary  goals  with  this  work  is  to  establish  a  reliable 
method for detecting polymorphic exploit instances. Thus, 
we  evaluate  two  popular  toolkits  for  polymorphic  exploit 
generation, along with a publicly available exploit known to 
contain  polymorphic  shellcode.  We  also  test  a  month’s 
worth  of  benign  traffic,  with  classification  disabled  (all 
packet payloads are analyzed). Our preliminary results are 
extremely promising: we observe no false positives when 
we analyzed the benign traffic and we can nearly detect all 
polymorphic versions of malicious contents generated using 
ADMmutate  (K2  1998)  and  Clet  engine  (CLET  Team 
2003). 
 
 
 
7.1  Linux Shell Spawning 
 
   In this first test, we select eight different remote exploits, 
which can spawn a shell in a machine running the Linux 
operating system. A template is created (Figure 11) to match 
the relevant system calls associated with this behavior. It 
can detect shells created as an immediate instance of the 
exploit, and, with an extension, those that are bound to a 
separate  network  port.  In  our  experiment,  we  built  an 
exploit  generator  tool  that  sends  exploit  packets  to  a 
honeypot  machine  registered  with  the  NIDS.  All  eight 
exploits are successfully detected as spawning a shell, while 
the two that bind the shell to a different port are also noted 
as such. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 11    template for Linux shell spawning code 
 
    
 
 
   The results for this first set of experiments are tabulated in 
Table 7.  The running time for these eight instances ranges 
from 2.36 seconds to 3.27 seconds. The average binary code 
size  is  less  than  10Kbytes  for  these  exploits.  As  a 
comparison, we ran two variants of the Netsky virus with an 
average code size of 22 Kbytes through our program and it 
takes  about  6.5  seconds  each  time.  The  time  reported  in 
Christodorescu et al. (2005) is about 40 seconds. 
GET /default.ida?XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%cbd3
%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%u
cbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b
00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a HTTP/1.0
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Table 7   Linux shell spawning buffer overflow exploits 
 
7.2  Polymorphic Shellcode Detection 
 
   To  detect  polymorphic  code,  we  create  a  template  that 
captures  the  decryption  loop  functionality  described  in 
Section  5.  Then,  we  create  a  tool  that  can  generate 
numerous  exploits  towards  a  honeypot  machine  that  was 
registered with the NIDS. The first test we perform is to 
verify  that o u r  s y s t e m  c a n  d e t e c t  t h e  i i s -asp-overflow.c 
exploit based on the template we designed. This particular 
exploit  has  a  decryption  routine  prefixed  to  an  encoded 
shell-spawning region of code. The shellcode is encoded to 
evade  detection  by  IDSs  that  employ  pattern-matching 
techniques. Using the template we design, our system was 
able to detect the decryption routine. The running time for 
this test is 2.14 seconds. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12  template for alternate ADMmutate decryption loop 
 
The ADMmutate kit (K2 1998) is a popular polymorphic 
shellcode  generation  toolkit.  It  incorporates  NOP-like 
instruction  insertion,  garbage  instruction  insertion, 
equivalent  instruction  replacement,  and  out-of-order  code 
sequencing  to  obscure  its  decryption  routine.  For  testing, 
100 instances of polymorphic payloads were generated, and 
inserted into a generic network buffer overflow exploit. As 
shown in Table 8, the first test which uses the template in 
Fig. 7 yielded only a 68% detection rate. Further manual 
inspection of the assembly code generated by our NIDS led 
us  to  establish  that  ADMmutate  incorporates  one  of  two 
distinct methods for its decryption routine. The first is the 
xor decryption our template can match, while the second is 
a decoding scheme involving a sequence of mov, or, and, 
and  not i n s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  p e r f o r m  o p e r a t i o n s  o n  a  s i n g l e  
memory location and register pair. Once we developed an 
enhanced template (shown in Figure12) that can match such 
behaviors,  we  achieve  100%  detection  of  all  shellcodes 
generated by ADMmutate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8   Polymorphic shellcode detection 
 
The Clet engine (CLET Team 2003) is another popular 
tool  for  generating  polymorphic  shellcode.  It  relies  on 
obscuring an xor based decryption routine in a fashion that 
will  defeat  data  mining  approaches  to  IDS.  Thus,  it 
incorporates many of the same features as ADMmutate, but 
Clet can also score the feature distribution probabilistically, 
so that the packet can appear to be “normal traffic.” Our xor 
decryption  template  matched  all  100  shellcode  instances 
that Clet generated. 
 
7.3  Code Red II Worm Detection 
 
A  template  is  devised  to  match  the  initial  exploitation 
vector  of  the  Code  Red  II  worm.  We  test  this  template 
against  12  5-minute  traces  collected  from  two  Class  B 
production networks, each with a total packet count of over 
200,000. Before evaluation, we note the correct number of 
instances of Code Red II within each capture. The results 
are tabulated in Table 9. From Table 9, one can note that 
every  instance  is  classified  and  matched  correctly  by  our 
NIDS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9   Detection of the Code Red II worm 
 
7.4  False Positive and Negative Evaluation 
 
   For a final test, we disabled traffic classification on the 
NIDS, and examined every packet’s payload in a month’s 
worth of traffic captured from two Class C networks (a total 
capture of 566MB). Most of the packets in this trace are 
legitimate  web  traffic.  The  traffic w a s  e x a m i n e d  
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to detect with our current template set (decryption routines, 
shell  spawning,  Code  Red  II  memory  addressing)  were 
present. No false positives were reported from our template 
matching m o d u l e ;  t h i s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  
Christodorescu et al. (2005), though now confirmed in the 
network scenario. 
   Our experiments so far show no false negatives. This is 
not to say that our current templates will be able to handle 
all  future  buffer  overflow  exploits.  We  anticipate  that  in 
future,  one  may  conceive  of  new  ways  to  exploit  buffer 
overflows using a different format from what is shown in 
Figure 9. This would drive up the false negative rate if the 
current  set  of  templates  could  not  match  the  new 
behaviours. As new attack classes emerge, researchers must 
respond  with  templates  to  match  the  attack  behaviours. 
Thus,  we  have  not  eliminated  completely  the  need  for 
human intervention in IDS, but have managed to reduce the 
threat posed by polymorphic and metamorphic variants of 
known attack classes.  
7  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
In  this  paper,  we  have  described  both  syntax-based  and 
semantic based approaches for dynamic network intrusion 
detection.  For  syntax-based  approaches,  we  evaluated  a 
fixed-partition and variable-length partition sliding-window 
scheme for automatic worm generation. Our results indicate 
that  the  variable  length  partition  scheme  is  more  flexible 
and  can  handle  several  types  of  polymorphic  worms.  To 
deal with more sophisticated polymorphic and metamorphic 
worms, we propose a semantic-aware approach. We have 
designed  and  built  a  NIDS  with  semantic  analysis 
capability.  We  have  performed  extensive  tests  on  our 
prototype system. Our results show that using high quality 
templates,  our  system  is  able  to  detect  a  wide  variety  of 
code exhibiting the same behavior, as opposed to the same 
formal syntax. Our experimental evaluation shows that our 
system  does  not  produce  any  false  positives  when  tested 
against a network trace of benign traffic. In the near future, 
we intend to classify more exploit behaviors so that we can 
generate additional useful templates that can be used in our 
NIDS to detect additional families of malicious traffic (i.e. 
email worms). Moreover, we will continue to advance our 
understanding  of  polymorphic  behavior  in  malicious 
software.  One  can  envision  a  multitude  of  encryption 
schemes  used  in  tandem  to  obscure  the  behavior  of  a 
malicious  payload.  A  template  that  detects  a  simple  loop 
may be sufficient for detection in a suspicious context (i.e. a 
web request with x86 executable content).  Finally, we also 
intend  to  optimize  our  implementation  so  that  it  can  run 
even faster than what has been achieved. 
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